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Abstract
This paper surveys the literature on the manufacturing sector in South Africa, focusing on
concentration and markup levels, with a view to inform policy. The literature has employed
a number of di⁄erent measures of industrial concentration, namely, the Gini and Rosenbluth
indices, the Occupancy Count, the C5% index and, to a lesser extent, Concentration Ratios and
the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index. Generally, manufacturing industry concentration is found to be
high and increasing up to 1996. However, all the measures show decreasing concentration post￿
1996. In respect of markups, the evidence suggests that markups in South Africa are signi￿cantly
higher than they are in comparable industries world-wide and they appear to be non-declining.
However, there are dissenting voices on this point. We then juxtapose the concentration and
price-cost margins ￿ndings to industry performance (at the macro level). In particular, we
review the literature that examines the relations between concentration and price-cost margins
on the one hand and output growth, productivity growth, employment, employment growth,
investment and export and import competitiveness on the other. We then draw implications
for competition policy in South Africa, pointing out areas that need further research as well as
international best practices.
KEYWORDS: manufacturing industry, industry concentration, South Africa, competition
policy
JEL classi￿cation: L16, L6
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to take stock of the literature on the state of South Africa￿ s manu-
facturing industries with respect to concentration levels, the levels of markups and how these relate
to manufacturing industry performance. We take a broader view of industry performance by trying
to relate industry structure to output growth, productivity growth, employment and employment
growth, investment and export and import competitiveness. We then draw implications for compe-
tition policy in South Africa.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the investigation of the structure of the South
African manufacturing sector. Although the literature on the South African manufacturing sector is
still limited, there already exist a number of important contributions in this regard. It is therefore
necessary to take stock of the research to date and to highlight the areas where knowledge is still
scant.
The literature examining concentration and markups in the South African manufacturing sector
has employed a number of di⁄erent measures of industry concentration, namely, the Gini (Fourie
and Smit (1989)), the Gini and Rosenbluth indices (Leach (1992); Fedderke and Szalontai (2004);
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1Fedderke and Naumann (2005)), the Occupancy Count (Leach (1992)), the C5% index (Fedderke and
Szalontai (2004); Fedderke and Naumann (2005)) and to a lesser extent the Concentration Ratios
and the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index.1 Industry concentration is, in general, found to be high and
increasing up to 1996. However, all the measures show decreasing concentration post-1996. In respect
of markups, the evidence seems to suggest that markups in South Africa are signi￿cantly higher than
they are in comparable industries world-wide and they are also non-declining (Fedderke et al (2005);
Aghion et al (2007)). Edwards and Van de Winkel (2005) and Du Plessis and Gilbert (2007) however
do not share this view. We relate the concentration and price-cost margins ￿ndings to industry
performance (at the macro level), namely, to output growth, productivity growth, employment and
employment growth, investment and export and import competitiveness. We then draw implications
for competition policy, pointing out areas that need further research as well as international best
practices.
Our general conclusion is that the evidence, at this stage, is not irrefutable. The major problem
we noted with the studies surveyed in this paper relates to the use of the Gini and Rosenbluth
indices as measures of industry concentration. These indices are used primarily because of data
limitations. The problem with these indices is that they are not very good measures of industry
concentration (at least in the sense of market power). As such, this brings into question the validity
of the conclusions reached based on these measures.
The paper is organised as follows: Section II reviews a number of the measures of industry
concentration that are commonly employed in the literature and give an in-depth discussion of the
measurement of industry concentration. Section III gives an overview of the data issues in South
Africa pertaining to the manufacturing sector. In this section, we point out the data limitations
and the comparability issues that are posed by the di⁄erent data collection methodologies for the
pre- and post-1996 periods. We examine the spatial distribution of manufacturing industry in
South Africa and its determinants. Section IV examines the South African industry structure,
evolution of concentration and the implications for industry performance. We also examine here the
relationship between industrial concentration and output growth, productivity growth, employment,
employment growth and investment. Section V examines the extent of markups in the South African
manufacturing industry and Section VI brie￿ y examines the productive-allocative e¢ ciency debate
and relates this debate to the South African evidence. Section VII reviews the literature on trade
liberalisation, industry structure and markups in South Africa and Section VIII concludes the paper.
2 Measurement of industry concentration
Industry/market concentration refers to the extent to which a small number of ￿rms or enterprises
account for a large proportion of economic activity such as total sales, assets or employment (OECD,
1993). Industry concentration is an important concept in competition policy debates. This is
because it is often argued that industry concentration is a proxy for the market power of ￿rms.
Following the industrial economics literature, the presumption is that high concentration implies
the leading ￿rms have large market shares and thus greater scope for exercising market power. For
instance, collusion is easier to sustain with a small number of ￿rms (Tirole, 1988). This reliance
on concentration measures in anti-trust policy has been necessitated by the di¢ culty of directly
measuring competition, though recently the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) has
tended to approach this measurement issue more directly (see Bikker and Haaf (2002a, 2002b).
Understanding the structure of an industry is important (especially for policy) since, in general,
industry structure has a bearing on the competitiveness of the industry in question. To this end,
economists have relied on concentration ratios to unpack the structure of a given industry.2 There
1These measures are de￿ned in Sections II and IV.
2We hasten to point out however that there is no obvious relationship between concentration and competitiveness.
Indeed, under some conditions, perfectly competitive behaviour is possible even in highly concentrated markets/
2are several methods of measuring industry concentration. These methods di⁄er mainly according
to their weighting schemes (and thus sensitivity of the index to changes at the tail-end of the ￿rm
size distribution) and structure (Bikker and Haaf (2002b: 4); see also Marfels (1971)). Bikker and
Haaf (2002b: 3-16) discuss ten such indices. We will not enumerate all of them here ￿except for
the four that are most relevant for our purposes, viz., the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index, the k ￿rm
concentration ratio, the Rosenbluth index and the Gini index.
The two most commonly used measures of industry concentration in international studies are
the k ￿rm concentration ratio (CRk) and the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Bikker and Haaf
(2002b); Ratnayake (1999)). The CRk ratio measures the (cumulative) market share of the largest





where si is the market share of ￿rm i;n is the total number of ￿rms in the industry and k (arbitrarily
chosen by the researcher) is the number of ￿rms included in the computation of the concentration
ratio. The advantage of the CRkover other measures lies in its simplicity and its minimal data
requirements. Computation of the CRkmeasure is straight forward: each of the k largest ￿rms￿
market shares is assigned equal weight of unity (the top k ￿rms are ranked in descending order with
the i ￿ th ￿rm receiving rank i:). Because only k < n ￿rms are considered, the CRk measure lies
between 0 and 1. The obvious weakness of the CRk measure is that it does not take into consideration
all the ￿rms in the industry. In particular, the e⁄ect of small ￿rms on market behaviour is totally
ignored. For this reason, this measure is called a discrete measure, as it only measures one point
on the concentration curve (Leach (1992: 388); Fedderke and Szalontai (2004: 2-3)). Also, CRk
assumes that the size distribution of the largest k￿rms is irrelevant for competition. This obviously
is a drawback.
The HHI, on the other hand, takes into account all the ￿rms in the industry (classi￿ed as a







where si is the market share of ￿rm i and n is the total number of ￿rms in the industry.3 The lower
bound of the index is 0 (under perfect competition) and the upper bound is 1 (under monopoly).




;where the index attains its minimum value of 1
nwhen ￿rms are of equal
size. The higher the index, the more concentrated the industry is. The U.S. Department of Justice
considers a market with an HHI index of less than 0.1 to be a competitive marketplace; an index
between 0.1 and 0.18 to be a moderately concentrated marketplace; and an index of 0.18 or greater
to be a highly concentrated marketplace (Investopedia.com). The advantage of the HHI as a measure
of competition is that it recognises the importance of large ￿rms in in￿ uencing competitiveness of
an industry but it also incorporates the in￿ uence of small ￿rms.
Although the HHI is considered superior to the CRk, these two measures ￿the CRk and the
HHI ￿are highly correlated so that the choice of which measure to use is, in general, not always
important (Schemalensee (1989: 966); Ratnayake (1999: 1043)).4;5
industries. (See for instance Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982)).
3In the United States, the HHI plays an important role in antitrust cases ￿in particular, in merger cases (Bikker
and Haaf (2002b: 7)).
4Bikker and Haaf (2002a) ￿nd, in a study of concentration indices for 20 countries, a correlation of 0.98 between the
the CR3 and the HHI. In particular, the implied rankings of the countries in terms of banking sector concentrations
is virtually identical for the CR3 and HHI.
5A caveat is in order though. As Schemalensee points out (1989: 966), the choice among even highly correlated
concentration measures can still signi￿cantly a⁄ect the results obtained (emphasis added).
3Other measures that have been used in the literature include the Rosenbluth index, measures of
industry inequality such as the Gini (Hart, 1961; Marfels, 1971), the Comprehensive Concentration
Index (due to Horvath, 1970) and the Entropy Index.6
The Rosenbluth Index, like the HHI, is a summary measure of concentration (it takes all ￿rms
into consideration). The ￿rms are ranked according to market share in descending order with the
i ￿ th ￿rm receiving rank i: Ranks of ￿rms are used as weights so that the i ￿ th ranked ￿rm is








where i is the rank of ￿rm i and si denotes ￿rm i0s market share. The Rosenbluth index, just like
the HHI, takes its minimum value of 1=n for equal size ￿rms and a maximum value of 1 in the case
of monopoly. The major drawback of the Rosenbluth index, and what distinguishes it from the HHI,
is its weighting scheme. Unlike the HHI, the Rosenbluth index assigns less weight to larger ￿rms
(￿rms with high rank) and more weight to smaller ￿rms (￿rms with lower rank). In other words,
the index is overly sensitive to changes in the tail-end of the ￿rm-size distribution.
Marfels (1971: 759) shows that there is an intimate relationship between the Rosenbluth index
and the Gini index ￿which he calls the ￿inequality counterpart to the Rosenbluth index￿(p. 761).
This relationship is given by:








where n is the number of ￿rms in the industry. The Gini index is a measure of inequality in the size
distribution of ￿rms. However, the usefulness of inequality measures in trying to understand issues
of industrial concentration has largely been tenuous. Early on, Horvath (1972: 841) questioned
the importance accorded to the concept of inequality in discussions of industrial concentration. The
problem with using measures of inequality to measure industry concentration is that the whole ￿idea
breaks down under the so called ￿ Lorenz-curve type problems￿ , when an industry with market shares
equally distributed among ￿rms would show no concentration whatsoever￿(ibid). See also Leach
(1992: 387).
In order to assess how the di⁄erent concentration indices perform in trying to capture the struc-
tural features of a market/industry, Marfels (1971: 761) calculates the implied concentration indices,
given four hypothetical market structures (his Tables 2 and 3). He compares ￿ve concentration in-
dices, namely; the HHI; the Rosenbluth index; the Gini index as well as the Entropy index and the
Comprehensive Concentration index. We reproduce Marfels￿Tables 2 and 3 (see our Tables 1 and
2), focusing only on the ￿rst three indices.
As can be seen from Table 2, the HHI and the Rosenbluth indices appear to agree in the way they
capture the structural features of ￿our￿hypothetical market. Markets I and II are fundamentally/
structurally similar and so are markets III and IV. Markets I and II are highly concentrated (one
dominant ￿rm and a fringe), whereas markets III and IV are moderately concentrated (few but more
or less equal size ￿rms). The HHI and the Rosenbluth indices also agree that market I is the most
concentrated market while market IV is the least concentrated market. This however, is not what
the Gini index re￿ ects. According to the Gini, market II is ￿ signi￿cantly￿more concentrated than
market I while market III is ￿ signi￿cantly￿less concentrated than market IV. Thus, to the extent that
concentration ratios are used to explain competitive performance (market power) in an industry, the
6We will not consider other indices proposed in the literature over and above those enumerated above. Also, we
will not discuss the Comprehensive Concentration and the Entropy indices here for at least two reasons: First, they
have not been widely employed in the international literature. Second, and more importantly for this paper, they
have not been employed in studies of industry concentration in South Africa. Interested readers should consult Bikker
and Haaf (2002b: 3-16) and Marfels (1971) for details.
4Gini index performs rather poorly as a measure of industry concentration. Thus Marfels (1971: 761)
concludes: ￿[t]he values of [G], ...., show a rather erratic course and prove its inadequacy to cope
with problems of fewness￿(emphasis added).
Although industry concentration proxies for the market power of ￿rms, high concentration per
se does not imply ￿rms actually exercise market power.7 Other market information should be taken
into account, e.g., entry barriers, price controls, etc. (Ratnayake, 1999).8 In fact, it is now generally
accepted that there is no obvious causal relationship between concentration (structure) and markup
(performance).9
3 Industry structure: Background issues and preliminaries
In this section we give a brief overview of the data issues and the spatial distribution of manufacturing
industry in South Africa and its determinants.
3.1 Data issues in South Africa
The South African manufacturing sector is quite well developed compared to most developing coun-
tries. Since 1917, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) has carried out a census of the 3 digit manufac-
turing sector largely on a biannual basis. This census was last carried out in 1996. Since then, data
on the manufacturing sector has been sporadic. In 2001, a new data set (the Large Sample Survey)
of the manufacturing sector was released. However, the form of the new survey data di⁄ers from the
earlier census data. This raises the question of comparability.
For the 2001 survey, a sample of 10 000 ￿rms was drawn out of a population of approximately 34
000 ￿rms at the 3 digit level (Fedderke and Naumann (2005: 15)). The manufacturing groups were
divided into four size groups ￿size group 1 being the large enterprises and size group 4 the small
￿rms. As Fedderke and Naumann (2005: 16) point out, the response rates to the survey decrease
with ￿rm size group ￿decreasing from about 91% for the size group 1 to about 72% for the size
group 4. Also, the large ￿rms are completely enumerated whereas the small ￿rms are not. The use
of this data may thus add idiosyncrasies into the calculations of variables (e.g., the Gini index) or
into the estimations.
The paucity of data on the manufacturing sector collected by the o¢ cial statistics agencies post-
1996 has meant that most empirical studies on South Africa have had to rely on commercially
produced data.10 Unfortunately, since this data is generated at the 3 digit SIC level, on the basis
of the 2 digit SIC based data, various issues of reliability arise in using this data source for both
analysis and policy prescription. In addition, this also raises serious issues of comparability with the
census of manufacturing data which is collected at the 3 digit level (see also Fedderke and Hill (2006)
and Aghion et al (2007)). Another major issue with regard to manufacturing data is that there is
7For instance, Fedderke and Simbanegavi (2007), in their study of the South African polymer market (a highly
concentrated market), ￿nd little evidence of the exercise of pricing power by the ￿rms in this market.
8For instance, a duopoly market in which ￿rms have equal and constant marginal costs, no capacity constraints
and compete with regard to prices will deliver a perfectly competitive outcome.
9The structure ￿conduct ￿performance (SCP) paradigm, as advanced by Bain in the 1950s, argues that high con-
centration is a pre-requisite for high markups ￿implying that concentration drives performance. This was challenged
in the 1970s by the e¢ ciency hypothesis ￿a competing explanation that reverses the direction of causality (Demsetz
(1973)). The theory runs as follows: Highly e¢ cient ￿rms (low cost ￿rms) can a⁄ord to grow their market shares by
lowering prices. This (lowering of prices) forces the ine¢ cient ￿rms out of the market leading to higher concentration.
Thus, market structure (concentration) is endogenous and is driven by performance. The modern view (New Empirical
Industrial Organization (NEIO)) however is that both industry structure and industry performance are endogenous ￿
being driven by some other factors. As Schmalensee (1989: 954) puts it, ￿..except in textbook competitive markets,
derived market structure is clearly a⁄ected by market conduct in the long-run￿. The NEIO does not assume a causal
relationship between market structure and performance, but rather, the approach tests competition and the use of
market power (Bikker and Haaf (2002b: 21); Bresnahan (1989)).
10The main source is Quantec.
5no ￿rm level evidence (data) on South Africa. Therefore, data limitations constrain empirical work
in South Africa.
Most of the South African studies surveyed in this article utilise data based on the tables pub-
lished by Stats SA in the census of manufacturing. The (abrupt) end of the census of manufacturing
in 1996 therefore makes it very di¢ cult to make meaningful comparisons of the studies using the
pre-1996 data and those using the post-1996 data as the data collection methodologies are di⁄erent.11
3.2 Spatial distribution of manufacturing industry in South Africa
In this section, we brie￿ y look at the spatial distribution of manufacturing activity in South Africa.
The spatial pattern of agglomeration and specialisation has implications for long term growth. For
instance, agglomeration may enhance growth through ￿cross-pollination of ideas￿ (Fedderke and
Wollnik (2007: 2)). Spatial location of ￿rms is driven by many di⁄erent factors, for instance, ￿rms
may be ￿pulled￿to a particular space by technological advantages (e.g., Silicon Valley) or by the
abundance of a factor input (immobile factor, e.g., natural resources) or by the ￿ big￿size of the
market.
Fedderke and Wollnik (2007) examine the spatial distribution of manufacturing industry in South
Africa for the period 1970 to1996 based on the manufacturing census.12 As they point out, South
Africa￿ s provinces vary in terms of climate, rainfall, maritime habours and natural resource deposits
(p. 6). These di⁄erent factors may thus di⁄erentially in￿ uence spatial location of industry. Results
indicate that manufacturing activity is concentrated in Gauteng. In particular, over the sample
period, on average 40+% of manufacturing valued added has been generated in Gauteng in each
period. This is followed by the coastal regions (Western Cape (WC), Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) and
Eastern Cape). In 1970, not much manufacturing activity was taking place in the Northern part of
the country (Figure 1). However, by 1996, the pattern appears to be changing, with some signi￿cant
improvements for the North-West and Limpopo provinces (Fedderke and Wollnik: 8). In KwaZulu-
Natal, manufacturing activity increased by 80% over the full sample period (p. 9).
[Figure 1 about here]
In terms of regional specialisation in South Africa, Fedderke and Wollnik (2007: 10) ￿nd a
weighted average Gini of 0.35 and they conclude that ￿measured regional specialisation is not very
high￿ . The main reason for a ￿low￿weighted average Gini is because Gauteng, the largest province
in terms of output (and therefore the province with the greatest weight) is the least specialised and
in addition, it shows no trend in specialisation (Fedderke and Wollnik: Figure 2).13 They also ￿nd
no consistent trend towards greater regional specialisation over the sample period. Looking at the
regions separately, the picture is di⁄erent. For KZN, evidence points to despecialisation through to
the mid 1980s and increased specialisation thereafter. The WC shows increased specialisation in the
1970s, despecialisation in the 1980s and respecialisation thereafter. The other smaller provinces also
show evidence of specialisation in the 1990s. Gauteng however shows low and stable specialisation
over the full sample period.
Fedderke and Wollnik employ the dynamic Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator to investigate
the determinants of industry (spatial) concentration. For human capital, they report an elasticity of
0.09. This ￿ small￿elasticity suggests geographic concentration of human capital-intensive industries
re￿ ecting the skills shortage in South African manufacturing during the last two decades of apartheid
(Fedderke and Wollnik: 17). They further ￿nd that both labour intensive and capital-intensive
industries tend to be geographically dispersed and hence have not been able to realise agglomeration
11Fedderke and Naumann (2005: 16) give some assurance. They argue that although there are issues with the
post-1996 data, the ￿ sampling e⁄ect should not be severe as only the smaller ￿rms are e⁄ected￿ . We however advise
caution as the comparability of the data remains in question.
12They reconstruct today￿ s nine provinces from this data. This is because geographical units have since been
rezoned. In addition, repeated revision of the industrial classi￿cations makes industries not strictly comparable across
time periods (Fedderke and Wollnik (2007: 7)). The data is on 22 manufacturing sectors.
13In terms of the straight average, the regional specialisation is substantially higher with a Gini of 0.50.
6bene￿ts. Labour intensive industries are possibly dispersed due to the apartheid pass laws which
restricted movement of black workers while capital-intensive industries are possibly dispersed due to
￿rst nature reasons (i.e., they are located) close to natural resources) (pp. 19-20). Scale economies,
as one would expect, favour industry concentration. In particular, a 1% increase in ￿rm speci￿c
internal scale economies will raise concentration (Gini) by about 0.19 percent (p. 20).14 In contrast,
linkages are found to have a large but negative e⁄ect on industry location (elasticity of -0.63).15
Lastly, Fedderke and Wollnik ￿nd that regional technology di⁄erences positively a⁄ect industry
concentration, with a Gini of 0.06 (their Figure 6). A summary of their analytical ￿ndings is given
in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
In summary, except for Gauteng, South African manufacturing industry is generally spatially
dispersed. This is mainly because of the prevalence of natural resource processing in manufacturing
industry. Industry tended to be located close to site to reduce transportation costs. The ￿ndings
above carry important policy implications. They point to heightened importance of infrastructure.
Good and e¢ cient infrastructure, by weakening the e⁄ect of distance, can aid the realisation of
scale economies through agglomeration. Further, because most manufacturing is located away from
harbours and ports (Gauteng province), liberalisation of the economy may not stand to bene￿t the
manufacturing sector unless it is accompanied by investments in infrastructure, in order to lower
transport and transactions costs.
4 Industry structure in South Africa: Evolution of concen-
tration levels and implications for industry performance
4.1 Industry concentration in South African manufacturing sector
The general ￿nding of high industry concentration is reported in all the studies of the South African
manufacturing sector at least up to the mid 1990s. However, there are some di⁄erences in respect
of the trend in industry concentration. The measures of industry concentration that have found
application in the South African industry studies are the Gini coe¢ cient (Fourie and Smit (1989);
Fedderke and Naumann (2005); Fedderke and Szalontai (2004)), the Rosenbluth index (Leach (1992);
Fedderke and Naumann (2005); Fedderke and Szalontai (2004)), the Occupants Count (Leach (1992))
and the C5% index (Fourie and Smit (1989); Fedderke and Naumann (2005); Fedderke and Szalontai
(2004)). The Occupants Count is de￿ned as the number of ￿rms responsible for a given proportion of
total industry output. For instance, the 80% Occupants Count is the number of ￿rms responsible for
80% of total output (Leach (p. 387)). Except for a few exceptions (Fourie (1996)), studies of industry
concentration in the South African manufacturing industry have not employed the concentration
ratio (CR) or the HHI. The reason being that the way in which the data (on the South African
manufacturing sector) is collected does not make it amenable to the calculation of these indices, at
least up to the mid 1990s (Fedderke and Szalontai (2004)).16
Fourie and Smit (1989) study trends in economic concentration in South Africa, with a view to
understanding the implications for the competitiveness of the South African manufacturing industry.
They considered the period 1972 to 1982. Due to ￿scantiness of available statistical information￿ ,
Fourie and Smit (1989: 242) only managed to compute the Gini coe¢ cient ￿a relative measure of
concentration. They could not, for instance, compute the concentration ratio, HHI or the Rosenbluth
index. Their preferred measures are the C5% index and the Gini coe¢ cient. They consider two
cases ￿one where they take into account imports and the other where they do not take imports
14In fact scale economies are found to be the most important pro-concentration force (p. 25).
15This however contradicts the theoretical priors as well as the ￿ndings for the developed economies (of a positive
e⁄ect). However, a negative elasticity is also found for Spain (Paluzie et al (2001)).
16Although it is possible to calculate these indices from the recent data sets, one cannot do this for a long enough
time (i.e., back to the 1970s) for the data to constitute a meaningful panel study.
7into account. They ￿nd high and increasing levels of economic concentration in the period under
study (pp. 244-247). In their view, this ￿tendency towards high concentration should be cause for
anxiety￿by the competition board (p. 251, emphasis added)).
Leach (1992) critiqued the approach of Fourie and Smit (1989), in particular their reliance on
the Gini coe¢ cient as a measure of industrial concentration. Leach argued that the data employed
by Fourie and Smit (1989) does permit the computation of a more appropriate (absolute) measure
of industrial concentration ￿the Rosenbluth index. Leach (1992) thus studies, using the Rosenbluth
index and the Occupancy Count, the trends of concentration in the South African manufacturing
sector for the period 1972 to 1985. He reports that the Rosenbluth index and the 80% occupancy
count agree on the direction of change in concentration in most of the industries (p. 392). However,
the conclusions with the Occupants Count and the Rosenbluth index were slightly di⁄erent. He
￿nds evidence consistent with decreasing industry concentration based on the Rosenbluth index
(a decrease in the average Rosenbluth index) but no change in concentration based on the 80%
Occupants Count (the average weighted change is zero). Leach ￿nds that the Rosenbluth index
decreases for 18 out of 26 industries and the decrease is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level (p.
390). Moreover, both the (unweighted) average and the weighted average changes in the Rosenbluth
between 1972 and 1985 are negative (-0.0046 and -0.0009, respectively) ￿indicative of a decrease in
concentration.
Leach argues that the decrease in concentration (as measured by the Rosenbluth index) can be
explained by the fact that ￿the percentage increase in the number of ￿rms was greater than the
percentage decline in equality of size￿ (p. 394). Leach￿ s ￿ndings contradict the earlier study by
Fourie and Smit (1989) who, using the Gini index as a measure of industry concentration, conclude
that concentration increased between 1972 and 1982.17 Leach strongly criticises Fourie and Smit
(1989) for drawing conclusions on manufacturing industry concentration based on a measure of
inequality of ￿rm size. As he points out, failure to maintain the distinction between concentration
and inequality could lead to erroneous conclusions (p. 395).
Leach (1992) could not close the debate on the trends of manufacturing industry concentration
in South Africa for two reasons. First, no clear cut conclusion can be given in respect of the
trend of manufacturing industry concentration since his two preferred measures lead to con￿ icting
conclusions. Although the Rosenbluth shows a statistically signi￿cant decrease at the 5% level in
manufacturing industry concentration between 1972 and 1985, the 80% occupancy count shows a
decrease in 16 of 26 industries, but not a statistically signi￿cant decrease. Since both measures are
plagued with problems, it is not clear what the conclusion ought to be.18 A more important limitation
however pertains to the objectives of the study. Is concentration the real issue of interest here? We
think not. Concentration is employed in this literature (including in Leach (1992) we believe) to try
and uncover the underlying market structure and hence the competitiveness of the manufacturing
sector. But this raises two further issues: (i) there is no obvious relationship between industry
concentration and competitive conduct (see for instance Baumol et al, 1982) and (ii), because of
the breadth of the manufacturing industry (Leach examines 26 sectors), it is virtually impossible to
de￿ne with any degree of precision what competitive conduct would entail given the heterogeneity
of the sectors. This puts into question the relevance of studies of industrial concentration, especially
at a highly aggregated level (3 digit level), in trying to understand competitive behaviour of ￿rms
in the manufacturing sector.
To bring a new perspective to the debate, Fourie (1996) examines industry concentration in
South Africa using a wide variety of concentration measures but only for a very limited period (1972
17Leach did not use the Gini as a measure of industry concentration but rather as a measure of inequality among
￿rms. He ￿nds that inequality among ￿rms increased between 1972 and 1985 (increase in the average Gini index
signi￿cant at the 1% level (p. 390)). In particular, the Gini coe¢ cient increased for all but three industries (namely,
Beverages, furniture and ￿xtures and transport equipment).
18As Leach￿ s Table 2 shows, the numbers of ￿rms involved is substantial (which militates against the Rosenbluth
index as it is overly sensitive to changes in the tail-end of the ￿rm size distribution). However, discrete measures of
concentration are also known to be inferior to summary measures (which militates against the occupancy count).
8to 1988). He compares results of the CR3;CR4;CR10; HHI, Gini, Rosenbluth and the Horvath
(Comprehensive concentration index). An interesting aspect of Fourie￿ s contribution is that for the
￿rst time, we have measures of industry concentration at the 5-digit level. We reproduce his Tables
1 and 4 (see our Tables 4 and 5), reporting only the CR3;HHI, Gini, Rosenbluth and the Horvath
indices.
We report the unweighted averages for the 5-digit levels in Table 5. The weighted averages are
lower than the unweighted averages.
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here.]
In Table 4 (3-digit level), all the measures except for the Gini show low industry concentration.
In particular, in terms of the HHI, the South African manufacturing sector is very competitive (since
the HHI index does not exceed 0.1). Also, all the measures, again except for the Gini, appear to
show stable to weakly increasing concentration. Table 5 (5-digit level) on the other hand appears to
show moderate to high concentration. Going by the HHI, the conclusion based on Table 5 is that
the South African manufacturing sector is moderately concentrated (see the discussion in Section
II). It is unfortunate that Fourie (1996) interprets this evidence as categorically indicative of high
concentration (p. 117).19
At both the 3-digit and the 5-digit levels, the HHI and the Rosenbluth yield more or less similar
(and low) values indicating low concentration whereas the CR3 and the Horvath index, both in
the 3-digit and the 5-digit levels, show moderate to high concentration. Although Fourie￿ s (1996)
analysis does not show ￿ high￿industry concentration in the South African manufacturing sector, this
data is slightly outdated (1972 to 1988), especially for policy purposes - hence the need for more
studies.
In an attempt to reconcile the earlier con￿ icting ￿ndings of Fourie and Smit (1989) and Leach
(1992) and in light of more recent data, Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and Fedderke and Naumann
(2005) examine industry concentration for the manufacturing sector over the 1972 to 1996 and 1972
to 2001 periods respectively. Unlike Leach (1992), they employ the Gini and the Rosenbluth indices
as well as the C5% index as measures of industry concentration. The C5% gives the proportion
of industry output accounted for by the largest 5% of the ￿rms (Fedderke and Naumann (2005:
2)).20 They also go a step further by analysing the relationship between concentration and other
dimensions of the economy, viz., real output growth, investment, employment, labour productivity,
among others. In this respect, they di⁄er with both Fourie and Smit (1989) and Leach (1992).
Both the Gini and the C5% indices point to high levels of concentration. Contrary to Leach
(1992), they ￿nd that the trend in concentration (based on these two measures) has been upward
over the period 1972 to 1996 in a wide range of industries (see Tables 6 and 7).
[Tables 6 and 7 about here]
Based on the Gini, only two sectors (Electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies and
Transport equipment) show a decrease in the Gini between 1972 and 1996. The same picture emerges
when one considers the C5% index. In terms of the Rosenbluth index, the results are mixed. Just as
in Leach (1992), the majority of the sectors (17 sectors) register a decrease in the Rosenbluth index
between 1972 and 1996 while only seven sectors show an increase (see the discussion in Fedderke and
Szalontai; pp 6-7). This seemingly contradictory evidence calls for parsimony in drawing conclusions
and prescribing interventionist competition policies ￿more so since these three measures are, at best,
crude measures of industry concentration in the sense of market power (more on this below).
Whereas Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) focus on the 1972 to 1996 period, Fedderke and Naumann
(2005) primarily focus on the post￿ 1996 period. Based on the C5% and the Gini indices, they ￿nd
high and increasing industry concentration up to 1996 but ￿nd evidence of decreasing industry
concentration post￿ 1996 (see Tables 8, 9 and 10 below). For the period up to 1996, the Rosenbluth
19Bikker and Haaf (2002a) consider concentration to be high if the 3 largest banks control at least two thirds of the
market (CR3 ￿ 0:66). For instance, Sweden (HHI=0.12, CR3=0.53); Norway (HHI=0.12, CR3=0.56) and Canada
(HHI=0.14, CR3=0.54) are considered to be moderately concentrated (pp. 24-25).
20However, the exact sense in which the word ￿largest￿ is used is not explained.
9index again yields results that appear to con￿ ict with those of the Gini. There is evidence of
increasing concentration in 7 out of 23 sectors while concentration decreases in 16 sectors.21 For a
detailed discussion, see Section 5 in Fedderke and Naumann (2005).
Results for the post￿ 1996 period are consistent across the three measures. In particular, the
average and the weighted average changes in all the three indices show a decrease in concentration
between 1996 and 2001. The unweighted C5% index rises from 56 percent in 1976 to 68 percent in
1996 and then falls to 54 percent in 2001. In terms of the Gini, only one sector (Paper and paper
products) register a positive change in concentration between 1972 and 2001 while all sectors register
a negative change (decrease in concentration) between 1996 and 2001. In terms of the Rosenbluth
index, all sectors register a decrease in concentration (negative change) both between 1996 and
2001 and between 1972 and 2001. There appears to be a strong decrease in concentration across
all sectors post￿ 1996. This is the period associated with trade liberalisation of the South African
economy (Edwards, 2005).
[Tables 8, 9 and 10 about here]
In summary, concentration in the South African manufacturing sector is found to be high and
increasing up to 1996 and, going by the recent data (Fedderke and Naumann (2005)), the trend in
concentration appears to be decreasing. This would seem to suggest that the liberalisation of the
South African economy in the 1990s (Edwards and Van De Winkel (2005); Edwards (2006)) is paying
o⁄. However, caution is advised as this "apparent" decline in concentration post-1996 is potentially
spurious.Two reasons can be advanced to explain such a "spurious"decline in concentration.
First, this apparent decline in concentration post￿ 1996 could well just be an artifact of the data.
The 2001 data is not collected in the same manner as the data for the period 1972 to 1996. For the
period up to 1996, data is compiled from the census of manufacturing whereas post￿ 1996, the data
comes from the Large Sample Survey of the manufacturing sector. This, as pointed out earlier in
Section III, raises the question of comparability (see also Fedderke and Naumann (2005)). Second,
the high concentration reported above should not be cause for panic. As pointed out earlier, the
indices used in the South African studies are in general, "second best" and in many cases,they appear
to give con￿ icting results.Not surprisingly, the international literature has largely shied away from
using these indices, preferring instead the concentration ratio (CR) and the HHI, which unfortunately
have proved di¢ cult to compute in the South African case.
In our view therefore, any conclusion to the e⁄ect that the manufacturing industry in South
Africa is highly concentrated needs to be quali￿ed. Although there certainly is evidence suggestive
of high concentration, there is hardly conclusive evidence to this e⁄ect. Our position is informed
by the following: First, as pointed out earlier, the Gini coe¢ cient is not a measure of industry
concentration (in so far as it relates to market power) but rather, a measure of inequality in the
distribution of industry output.22 Hence, conclusions on concentration based on the Gini coe¢ cient
(Fedderke and Szalontai (2004), Fedderke and Naumann (2005), Fourie and Smit (1989)) cannot be
taken as "strong"evidence of high concentration in the South African manufacturing industry. All
that this evidence (based on the Gini coe¢ cient) tells us is that there is a great deal of inequality
in the way output is distributed in the di⁄erent industries: nothing more.
Second, evidence of "high"concentration based on the C5% index is very problematic. How is
this index to be interpreted? To see the problem of interpretation associated with the C5% index,
consider the following simple example:
Example 1 Suppose we have three industries. Industries A, B and D with respectively 1000 ￿rms,
100 ￿rms and 20 ￿rms. Suppose that in each of these industries, the "largest" 5% of the ￿rms
account for 50% of industry output. This means that inindustry A, ￿fty ￿rms account for half the
21Leach (1992) ￿nds that the Rosenbluth index decreases for 18 out of 26 industries.
22Leach (1992: 387) argues strongly against the use of the Gini index as a measure of industry concentration. He
lists a long list of scholars who have questioned its use as a measure of industry concentration (to which we can add
Horvath (1972)). Indeed, the Gini index does not ￿nd its way into the leading texts in Industrial Economics, for
instance, Tirole￿ s (1988) textbook.
10industry output (thus, on average, each ￿rm accounts for only 1% of industry output), in industry
B, ￿ve ￿rms account for half the industry output (thus, on average, each ￿rm accounts for only 10%
of industry output), while in industry D only one ￿rm accounts for half the industry output.
Can we say that these three industries are highly (and equally) concentrated? What, if anything,
can we infer about market power in these three industries? Obviously, in general not much can be
said in respect of the competitiveness of these industries. However, given the average size of the
"large" ￿rms in industries A and B, inference of high concentration and therefore high market
power is clearly questionable.23 However, in industry D, the large ￿rm has a possibility to abuse
its dominant position as it virtually controls half of the market and hence a concern about high
concentration can be justi￿ed. Now, based on Leach (1992), the average number of ￿rms in these
industries is large.24 From Leach (1992: Table 2, p. 393), the average number of ￿rms per sector
was 664 ￿rms in 1985.25
Third, even if the Rosenbluth index correctly captured industry concentration, evidence of high
concentration based on the Rosenbluth index (Leach (1992); Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and
Fedderke and Naumann (2005)) is still tenuous. The above studies all ￿nd very low values for the
Rosenbluth index. Leach (1992) ￿nds average Rosenbluth indices of 0.033 for 1972 and 0.028 for the
year 1985 while Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and Fedderke and Naumann (2005) ￿nd Rosenbluth
indices between 0.0051 and 0.03 for the period 1972 to 2001). Going by the US Department of
Justice￿ s interpretation/categorisation (seediscussion in Section II),these low values of R are to
be interpreted as evidence that the manufacturing industry in South Africa is competitive and
thus not a major cause for concern. Thus, the increase in inequality of ￿rms (Leach (1992: 390);
Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and Fedderke and Naumann (2005)) and the increase in the C5%
index (Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and Fedderke and Naumann (2005)) have not in any way
reduced the competitiveness of the South African manufacturing industry as the Rosenbluth index
has remained under 10% since 1972.26
In summary, no conclusive evidence has been put forward yet to the e⁄ect that the South African
manufacturing sector is highly concentrated ￿at least not in the sense of competitiveness. Thus
while the evidence advanced is useful and can thus serve as "stylised facts", pronouncements to the
e⁄ect that industry concentration is high in South Africa require quali￿cation. Studies surveyed
here do not shed much light on the issue of concentration ￿at least in the sense of competitiveness
of the sectors concerned. Thus more focused work is needed before any such pronouncements can
be taken as irrefutable.
4.2 Concentration - productivity debate
From a competition policy perspective, industry concentration and the associated market power
are issues of concern primarily because ine¢ ciencies and price gouging lower consumer welfare.
However, the implications of anticompetitive market structures are much broader than consumer
23Yet another problem with this index is that although the average C5% index increased between 1972 and 1996
from 56% to 68% suggesting an increase in average concentration, the number of ￿rms contributing to this output
increased from 29 ￿rms in 1976 to 50 ￿rms in 1996 (Table 6 above). It is di¢ cult to conclude based on this information
that concentration increased between 1972 and 1996. If anything, this points to decreasing concentration (each of the
C5% ￿rms account for a smaller share of output in 1996 than in 1976). But then, this also brings into question the
asserted ￿consistency￿(Fedderke and Naumann (2005: 6)) between the Gini and the C5% results
2426 industries in Leach (1992) and 24 industries in Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and Fedderke and Naumann
(2005).
25Fabricated metal sector had the largest number of ￿rms in 1985 (2865 ￿rms) while the Glass sector had the
smallest number of ￿rms (49 ￿rms). Clearly therefore, the issue of the interpretation of the C5% index is critical.
26Fourie (1996: 102) argues that, for a Gini value of about 0.6-0.8 and the smallest 3-digit industry having about
30 ￿rms, one generally gets a maximum value of the Rosenbluth not exceeding 0.20 (as opposed to the theoretical
upper bound of unity). Notwithstanding that, in our view, a value of 0.03 is still ￿low￿ to make inferences of high
concentration even if the maximum is 0.20. Even more, the HHI also gives low values consistent with competitive to
moderately concentrated markets.
11welfare. There are debates on the concentration-productivity front, concentration-employment front,
concentration-investment front, among others. Below we survey some studies (both local and inter-
national) dealing with these issues.
There are a number of studies that examine the relationship between concentration and pro-
ductivity. This is an important subject as the highly productive economies tend to grow faster
than countries with lower productivity. This is especially important in the South African context
where the government has adopted the ASGI-SA (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South
Africa) programme to try and improve the living standard of the average South African through
economic growth. If concentration enhances productivity, then, given the "high" levels of concen-
tration reported above, South Africa is poised for accelerated growth and the objective of policy
should be to preserve industry concentration. On the other hand, if concentration has a detrimental
e⁄ect on productivity, then South Africa has a reason to worry and the objective of policy should
be to promote entry of new ￿rms and to foster competition. In this instance, the noted decrease in
concentration in the most recent time period (Fedderke and Naumann (2005)) would be welcome (if
it is real, rather than an artifact of the data).
International studies of the relationship between concentration and productivity have had mixed
￿ndings: some ￿nd a small positive e⁄ect while others ￿nd no e⁄ect at all. In their study of the
relation between concentration and productivity changes in the short and long-run for the U.S. man-
ufacturing sector, Greer and Rhoades (1976) ￿nd that concentration enhances productivity in the
long-run. They conclude that "growth in output and the degree of concentration are the primary de-
terminants of long-run productivity change"(p.1033).27The e⁄ect of concentration however is small.
They also ￿nd evidence indicating that capital-intensive industries have higher productivity changes
than other industries (p. 1034). This is consistent with other studies that ￿nd that, over the long-run,
productivity rises faster in more concentrated industries so that ￿unit labour costs rise less rapidly
in more concentrated than in less concentrated industries"(see Greer and Rhoades(1976:1031)).On
the contrary, Sveikauskas and Sveikauskas (1982) ￿nd no evidence of a positive or negative e⁄ect of
concentration on productivity growth for the U.S. They conclude that "R&D is the only in￿ uence
which consistently has a positive in￿ uence on productivity growth under all circumstances" (p. 773).
Ward (1987) di⁄ers from the majority of the other studies in that he studies only one industry ￿the
U.S. meatpacking industry. Like Sveikauskas and Sveikauskas (1982), he ￿nds no signi￿cant positive
or negative relationship and thus he concludes that ￿..empirical results reported here for a single
industry con￿ ict with those of previous interindustry studies" (p. 221).28
For South Africa, only a few studies consider the relation between concentration and produc-
tivity in the manufacturing sector. Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) examine this relationship for the
manufacturing sector in South Africa, using the Gini and the Rosenbluth indices as measures of
concentration. They ￿nd that increased concentration is detrimental to output growth in the South
African manufacturing sector, lowers labour productivity and raises unit labour costs. Fedderke
and Naumann (2005) explore this issue further and their ￿ndings appear to corroborate the earlier
￿ndings of Fedderke and Szalontai (2004).
Aghion et al (2007)) directly examine the e⁄ect of competition on productivity growth in South
Africa. They employ three data sets, namely, the industry level UNIDO panel data for South Africa,
￿rm level Worldscope data for publicly-listed companies and the TIPS (Trade and Industrial Policy
Strategies) industry level panel data (see Aghion et al (2007: 5-6). The paper starts with a theo-
retical exposition that explains the channel by which competition is expected to a⁄ect productivity
growth. They isolate two e⁄ects: the Schumpeterian e⁄ect and the escape competition e⁄ect. The
27The positive e⁄ect is explained by the fact that higher industry concentration allows ￿rms to be larger which
allows the ￿rms to capitalise on economies of scale. This results in reduced production costs and increased e¢ ciency
(Ward (1987: 220)).
28Recent literature however generally ￿nds a positive e⁄ect of product market competition on productivity growth
(Nickell (1996), Blundell et al (1999), Aghion et al (2005) among others). We hasten to point out however that
product market competition and market concentration are not mutually exclusive. Hence these studies do not speak
directly to the relationship between concentration and productivity.
12Schumpeterian e⁄ect occurs where an increase in product market competition reduces the rents from
innovation. Because competition reduces the rents from innovation, it reduces the ￿rms￿incentives
to innovate.Consequently, productivity growth falls (ibid: 3). This is the case for ￿rms immediately
below the technology frontier. The escape competition e⁄ect, on the other hand, occurs when ￿rms
are "forced" to innovate so as to maintain the technological gap between themselves and their nearby
competitors. Firms at the technology frontier realise that if they do not invest and innovate, ￿rms
immediately below them will catch up ￿causing the former leaders to lose their monopoly rents.
Hence, the leaders have an incentive to innovate in order to escape competition. Because ￿rms invest
in R&D and innovate, this raises productivity growth.
Using the three data sets, they examine the relationship between a measure of productivity
growth and the price-cost margin. Aghion et al (2007) estimate the following equation:
Pgrowthit = ￿ + ￿PCMit + Ii + It + "it;
where Pgrowth is a measure of productivity growth, PCM is a measure of industry competitiveness,
Ii and It are industry and year ￿xed e⁄ects and "it is the random error term for industry i:
The results indicate a strong positive e⁄ect of product market competition on productivity
growth. In particular, the results show a negative impact of the price-cost margin (an inverse
measure of product market competition) on productivity growth (ibid: 10-15). See also their Tables
13-18 and Figures 2 and 3 below.29 A similar ￿nding is reported in Zitzewitz (2003). In his study of
the US and UK tobacco industries, he ￿nds a positive correlation between product market compe-
tition and productivity. In particular, he concludes that the breakup of American Tobacco in 1911
and the resulting competitive environment led to greater technological progress and higher labour
productivity in the USA ￿allowing the US tobacco productivity to overtake the UK productivity in
the same sector.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
In summary, the evidence on the relationship between concentration and productivity is a mixed
bag. Some studies ￿nd a negative relationship while other studies ￿nd a positive association. The
implications of the South African ￿ndings, if the results are to be believed, are immediate. Increased
concentration does not seem to raise the e¢ ciency of production (Fedderke and Szalontai (2004);
Aghion et al (2007, 2008)). These ￿ndings carry implications for competition policy. First, mergers,
to the extent that they increase concentration, should be closely scrutinised. Second, since high
markups lower productivity growth, entry by new ￿rms into the concentrated industries and import
penetration into such markets ought to be encouraged so as to ensure the market is contestable.
That is, entry barriers need to be lowered and import tari⁄s reduced.
The results for South Africa reported above are important, but we advice caution in interpretation
for at least two reasons: First, as discussed above, the totality of the evidence on the relationship
between concentration and productivity is mixed and thus inconclusive. For instance, whereas
Zitzewitz (2003) ￿nds a positive correlation between product market competition and productivity
in the U.S and U.K tobacco industries, Hannah (2004) ￿nds the opposite (at least for the period
before the First World War). He ￿nds that if the sample of countries is expanded beyond these two
countries (U.S. and U.K.), a positive correlation emerges (p. 13). He hence concludes: there is thus
evidence that "monopoly sometimes encourages investment in innovation" (p.14).
Second, it appears the productivity growth equation employed by Aghion et al (2007) is somewhat
misspeci￿ed. There is potential endogeneity between price-cost margins and productivity growth:
both could be determined by other factors, e.g., R&D. Observe that R&D can potentially increase
both labour productivity and price-cost margins (R&D lowers costs).30 Alternatively, high price-cost
29It is important to point out that all the three data sets are consistent in ￿nding that higher markups are associated
with lower productivity growth. They also ￿nd that the economic magnitude of the e⁄ect is quite large. ￿In particular,
a ten percent reduction in SA markups would increase productivity growth in SA by 2 to 2.5% per year￿(Aghion et
al (2007: 1)).
30Time and industry ￿xed e⁄ects cannot adequately capture R&D.
13margins, by increasing pro￿tability and hence investment, may lead to higher productivity growth.
Such endogeneity/simultaneity, if present, may lead to biased estimates of the parameters and hence
wrong inferences.31
4.3 Concentration and investment
Many scholars see investment as the engine of economic growth. Generally, the more investment
the economy can generate, the more productive that economy will be. In fact, ￿low investment
levels have often been identi￿ed as a key factor in explaining suboptimal growth rates for the South
African economy" (Fedderke and Naumann (2004: 18)). Given this importance of investment for
economic growth, and the objectives of government policy through ASGI-SA, it is imperative that
we understand the relationship, if any, between concentration and investment. Does concentration
promote or hurt investment in South Africa?
Using both the bivariate and multivariate analyses, Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) ￿nd no con-
clusive evidence of the e⁄ect of concentration on investment in the South African manufacturing
sector. Both the Gini and the Rosenbluth are signi￿cant when controlling for the two indices both
individually and jointly. However, the coe¢ cients carry opposite signs (see Table 11). Whereas the
Rosenbluth is consistently negative suggesting a negative e⁄ect of concentration on investment in
the South African manufacturing sector, the Gini is consistently positive suggesting that increased
concentration (inequality of ￿rm size distribution) is good for investment (see Fedderke and Szalon-
tai (2004: 21-22)).32 In light of new data (release of the Large Sample Survey of the manufacturing
sector in 2001), Fedderke and Naumann (2005) examine the relationship between concentration and
investment for 23 manufacturing sectors. They ￿nd evidence pointing to a negative relationship.
The coe¢ cient of the Gini is negative but insigni￿cant while the coe¢ cient of the Rosenbluth is neg-
ative and signi￿cant (Table 12). The implication is thus that concentration is harmful to investment
in South Africa (Fedderke and Naumann (2005: 24)).
[Tables 11 and 12 about here]
We have a few comments with regard to this evidence. First, although the evidence points to
a harmful e⁄ect of concentration on investment in South Africa, we do not think the evidence is
conclusive, especially in light of the ￿ndings of Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and also given that
some of the coe¢ cients in Fedderke and Naumann (2005) are insigni￿cant.33 Second, an important
argument which calls for parsimony in interpretation of the results is that it is not clear to what extent
the "concentration" indices employed in the South African studies re￿ ect the actual concentration in
the South African manufacturing sector. As pointed out earlier, the Gini and the Rosenbluth are not
generally regarded as good measures of industry concentration. Third, as discussed in Section III, the
recent data from the ￿ Large Sample Survey￿ employed in Fedderke and Naumann (2005) is di⁄erent
in form to the earlier manufacturing sector census data employed in Fedderke and Szalontai (2004).
This raises comparability issues and it is thus not clear to what extent this might have a⁄ected the
results of Fedderke and Naumann (2005). It is our view therefore that the issue of the relationship
between concentration and investment in the South African context is still not satisfactorily resolved
and hence further research in this regard is needed.
31It is somewhat strange that while innovation and hence productivity is driven by investments in R&D in their
theoretical model, Aghion et al (2007) do not include (omit) R&D in their empirical speci￿cation and estimation of
the productivity growth equation.
32Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) point out that the apparent divergence between the Gini and the Rosenbluth needs
to be contextualised. An increase in the inequality of the size distribution of ￿rms raises the Gini while an increase
in the number of ￿rms lowers the Rosenbluth index. Since both these e⁄ects have been taking place over the sample
period, a divergence between the Gini and the Rosenbluth can be expected (pp. 21-22).
33Fedderke and Naumann (2005) do not provide intuition or explain why the Gini coe¢ cient should change sign
when they add one more data point. Is this an artefact of the data or could this be an economically meaningful
result? An explanation is clearly needed given the argument pro⁄ered by Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) justifying
the di⁄erent signs for the Gini and the Rosenbluth (see footnote 33 above).
144.4 Concentration ￿employment nexus
In investigating the causal relationship between concentration and employment, Fedderke and Sza-
lontai (2004) ￿nd no conclusive evidence when considering the bivariate associations. However,
further examination (using multivariate analyses) shows that increased concentration lowers em-
ployment in South African manufacturing industry.34 The Gini and the Rosenbluth indices both
have negative coe¢ cients, ￿though only the Rosenbluth proves statistically signi￿cant" (Fedderke
and Szalontai: 20).When controlling for the two concentration measures individually, the coe¢ cients
are respectively -0.03 and -0.27 for the Gini and Rosenbluth indices. When jointly controlling for
the two indices, the coe¢ cients are respectively -0.07 and -0.10 for the Gini and the Rosenbluth
indices.35 Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) also show that the e⁄ect of concentration on employment
is non-linear and is also a⁄ected by the number of ￿rms. In particular, the higher the level of con-
centration, the greater the (negative) e⁄ect of a further increase in concentration on employment
and, for any given level of concentration (Gini), a small increase in concentration will have a greater
negative e⁄ect on employment the smaller is the number of ￿rms in the industry (p. 20) (see Figure
4 and Table 11).
[Figure 4 about here]
Further support for this negative association is provided by Fedderke and Naumann (2005).
They ￿nd that higher industry concentration is negatively associated with both employment and
employment growth. Based on the Rosenbluth index, the coe¢ cient on employment is negative for
all the census years while the coe¢ cient of employment growth is negative in all but two census
years (1985 and 1988). In terms of the Gini however, the picture is more blurred. The coe¢ cient for
employment is positive for 7 census years and negative for the last three census years (1993, 1996
and 2001). In terms of employment growth, the coe¢ cient is positive for 6 census years and negative
for 4 census years. This suggests that the Gini (inequality of ￿rm size) is positively associated with
both employment and employment growth.36 Although the evidence is mixed, the indication is thus
that highly concentrated sectors are "more likely to exhibit lower levels of employment"(Fedderke
and Naumann(2005: 17)).37
In their investigation of labour market ￿ exibility in South African manufacturing, Fedderke
and Hill (2006) ￿nd that about two thirds of labour employed in South African manufacturing is
devoted to ￿xed costs while only a third of the labour is devoted to variable costs (aggregate labour
adjustment coe¢ cient for the manufacturing sector of between 2.84 and 3.43 over the full sample
period, see their Table 6). They also ￿nd that labour market ￿ exibility increased in the 1970s and
early 1980s but decreased in the 1990s (see their Table 7 and Figure 5 below). They ￿nd evidence
supportive of the increased use of capital in place of labour during periods of increasing labour
market in￿ exibility. That is, labour market in￿ exibility increases investment in capital ￿thereby
raising the capital to labour ratio in manufacturing (increased mechanisation).38 This relationship
is summarised in Figure 5 below. Figure 5 plots the trend structure in labour ￿ exibility and the
true estimated elasticity of substitution between capital and labour over time.
34It is conceivable that what is captured here is the fact that large ￿rms are more capital-intensive than small ￿rms.
That is, they have higher K/L ratios. However, this is not consistent with falling labour productivity as concentration
increases.
35Given the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients, the e⁄ect of concentration on employment appears to be quite small.
36It should also be noted that the coe¢ cients for output and employment for all the census years are too small to
be of any economic signi￿cance (see Fedderke and Naumann (2005): Table 7).
37A caveat is in order though. Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and Fedderke and Naumann (2005) are largely
descriptive in their approach. This is quite limiting. Where results are not as expected or where the di⁄erent measures
disagree, an intuitive explanation/justi￿cation of the results to be believed is indispensable ￿yet this is seldom done in
the Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) and Fedderke and Naumann (2005) studies (see for instance Fedderke and Naumann
(2005: 16-26)).
38An interesting question is whether those ￿rms/industries that respond to increased labour market in￿exibility by
raising the capital/labour ratio would reverse this during periods of increased labour market ￿exibility. If not, then
the negative employment e⁄ect of increased labour market in￿exibility (as documented by Fedderke and Hill (2006))
would carry over into the future. This would paint a grim picture for employment growth prospects in South Africa.
15The ￿nding that an increase in labour market ￿ exibility raises the capital to labour ratio accords
well with intuition: capital and labour are in most cases substitutable, at least to some extent. This
has important implications for employment ￿especially in a developing country context where there
is abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. The policy implication is thus that labour market
￿ exibility is good for employment and therefore policies that enhance labour market ￿ exibility (such
as ease of hiring and ￿ring) should be encouraged.
[Figure 5 about here]
In summary, studies that examine the relationship between concentration and employment in
South Africa have consistently found the relationship to be negative: High concentration lowers
employment. This ￿nding is important for policy, especially given the high levels of unemployment
in South Africa, namely, to address the unemployment problem in South Africa, it is necessary to
￿rst address the structure of industry.
5 Markup pricing in South African Manufacturing industry





where P is the price and MC is the marginal cost. Like the concentration indices, the markup is
a measure of market power. Unlike the concentration indices however, the markup is more precise
in that it measures the extent of (exercisable) market power. That is, it measures how much ￿rms
can raise prices above marginal costs. The markup is closely related to the Lerner index (price-cost
margin). The Lerner index is given by:
P ￿ MC
P
= 1 ￿ 1￿;
where ￿ is as de￿ned above. Under perfect competition ￿ = 1while under monopoly or oligopoly
with signi￿cant entry barriers the markups can be substantial (￿ > 1).
5.1 Extent of markups in South African manufacturing sector
Fedderke et al (2005) investigate the extent of markups in the South African manufacturing sector
over the period 1970 to 1997. They ￿nd high markups for the South African manufacturing industry
(see also Fedderke and Hill (2006)). A related study is Aghion et al (2007) who examine the
relationship between competition and productivity growth in South Africa. They too ￿nd that
markups in South African manufacturing are signi￿cantly higher than in corresponding industries
worldwide.39 Using three alternative data sets, they consistently ￿nd evidence of high and non-
declining price-cost margins (Table 13). In particular, the average markup for the manufacturing
sector over the full sample period is 54% (Aghion et al (2007: 9)). They also ￿nd that, measured in
terms of Net income/Sales, Net income/Assets and Net income/Equity, South African listed ￿rms
exhibit around 50% higher pro￿tability compared to their world counterparts (p. 8).
[Table 13 about here]
Fedderke et al (2005) ￿nd that: (i) Increasing within industry import penetration does not sig-
ni￿cantly lower markups (coe¢ cient not statistically signi￿cant) but (ii) increasing between industry
import penetration signi￿cantly lowers markups. The same is found for within and between indus-
try export penetration (export penetration lowers markups with the larger e⁄ect being reserved for
39Fedderke et al (2005) ￿nd, using various model speci￿cations, the local markups to be about twice those in
comparable U.S. industries. Also, the high markups reported in Aghion et al (2007) and Fedderke et al (2005) have
not been eroded by liberalisation of the South African trade regime (Aghion et al (2008: 12)). If anything, controlling
for trade liberalisation appears to raise the pricing power of the South African manufacturing industries (ibid).
16between industry export penetration). However, the authors do not give any intuition for the seem-
ingly counterintuitive ￿ndings. For instance, it seems counterintuitive that import penetration of
close substitutes (increase in within industry penetration) does not seem to lower industry markups
while import penetration at the 3 digit manufacturing sector level lowers markups.
Fedderke et al (2005) also ￿nd that ￿rms that become more cost competitive relative to their
industry average face lower markups while ￿rms that face improved cost conditions relative to the
manufacturing sector average experience considerably greater markups of price over marginal cost.
The ￿rst part of this ￿nding appears to support the e¢ ciency hypothesis of the structure conduct
performance paradigm. According to this view, ￿rms that become more cost competitive relative
to their industry average will respond by lowering their prices ￿an action which may induce the
exit of the less e¢ cient ￿rms leading to higher industry concentration (Bikker and Haaf (2002b:
23)). Among other ￿ndings, the authors (Fedderke et al, 2005) also note that rising concentration of
industries serves to raise the markups, especially rising concentration between industries. However,
within industry changes in concentration do not signi￿cantly a⁄ect markups. This appears to ￿t
well with the general thinking in industrial organisation that there is no obvious causal relationship
between industry concentration and markups. Markups are determined mainly by conduct and not
market structure. See for instance Schmalensee (1989), Bresnahan (1989) and Ornstein (1975).40
The ￿ndings of Fedderke et al (2005) and Aghion et al (2007) reported above contrast sharply
with those of Edwards and Van de Winkel (2005).41 Edwards and Van De Winkel (2005), in their
investigation of the e⁄ect of trade liberalisation on South African manufacturing sector markups,
￿nd low markups for the South African manufacturing industry. In particular, the levels of markups
are di⁄erent whether intermediate inputs are included or not. For instance, when intermediate
inputs are excluded, Fedderke et al (2005) ￿nd the markups average between 72% and 79% while
Edwards and Van De Winkel (2005) ￿nd the markups average about 42%. There also appears to
be disagreement in respect of the comparability of the South African industry markups with other
countries. Whereas Fedderke et al (2005) and Aghion et al (2007) conclude that South African
markups are high relative to other countries, Edwards and Van De Winkel (2005) conclude that
South African manufacturing industry markups fall at the lower end of the (13-25%) range of the
average markups of comparator countries (p. 7).
Edwards and Van de Winkel (2005) ascribe the di⁄erences to the use of di⁄erent estimators, the
use of di⁄erent estimates of the return to capital and to their use of a longer time horizon.42 In
our view however, di⁄erent time horizons should not a⁄ect the results that much unless there are
major structural changes in the manufacturing sector between 1998 and 2002. In the absence of such
structural breaks, the likely explanation of the di⁄erences in the results is the use of di⁄erent esti-
mators. Unfortunately, Edwards and Van de Winkel (2005) neither explain the di⁄erences between
their estimator and that of Fedderke et al (2005) nor the di⁄erences between their return to capital
measure and that of Fedderke et al and as a result, it is not clear which results are to be believed
and why they should be believed. It would have been useful had they justi￿ed their estimator, at
the least.
The policy implications of these ￿ndings are as follows: First, trade liberalisation may serve to
reduce markups. Trade liberalisation opens up the domestic market to import competition which,
as Fedderke et al (2005) and Edwards and Van de Winkel (2005) argue, lowers markups. This is
40A simple example illustrates this point: Consider a duopoly market with equal but constant marginal cost in
which ￿rms compete a la Bertrand. Such an industry structure is highly concentrated yet also (in the absence of
collusion) highly competitive.
41Du Plessis and Gilbert (2007) test for the robustness of the Aghion et al (2007) ￿ndings (that South African
￿rms are more pro￿table than their world counterparts) wherein they controlled for survivorship bias. Comparing the
pro￿tability of the JSE listed South African ￿rms and the Dow Jones listed American ￿rms, Du Plessis and Gilbert
￿nd little support for Aghion et al￿ s (2007) claim of greater pro￿tability of South African listed ￿rms. In particular,
they report that ￿the median USA industrial ￿rm has been more pro￿table than SA industrial ￿rms 56% of the time
over [the 1980-2006] period when looking at their operating margins￿(p. 8).
42Whereas Fedderke et al (2005) study the period 1970 to 1997, Edwards and Van de Winkel study the period 1970
to 2002.
17important as reduction in markups will have a positive e⁄ect on productivity growth in South Africa
(Aghion et al (2007)). Second, competition policy can be used to increase industry competitiveness
and thus reduce price-cost margins. Tough merger policies and the breaking or lowering of entry
barriers are some of the policies at the disposal of competition authorities. Where concentration is
not dictated to by the desire to enjoy economies of scale, divestiture can be instituted as a way to
enhance competition. These policies may be necessary since anticompetitive pricing (high markups)
may have negative growth implications by their curtailment of productive capacity (Fedderke et al
(2005: 29); Aghion et al (2008)).
An issue that is, however, not addressed in the South African studies of industry concentration
is that of industry (sectoral) concentration versus aggregate (whole manufacturing sector) industry
concentration. Fedderke et al (several), Leach (1992), Edwards and Van de Winkel (2005), among
others study industry concentration at the 3 digit manufacturing sector level. For policy purposes,
focusing only on the aggregate concentration may mask other important industry characteristics
and dynamics (Fourie (1996: 98)).43 Indeed, in his study of concentration in the New Zealand
manufacturing sector, Ratnayake (1999) ￿nds a declining trend in the levels of concentration in
New Zealand manufacturing industries (p. 1046) yet ￿nds that aggregate concentration has actually
increased over the same period (p. 1047) ￿a seemingly contradictory ￿nding. For an explanation,
see Ratnayake (1999).
5.2 Markups and the broader implications
In surveying the literature on the South African manufacturing industry structure and perfor-
mance, we found two main results: (i) the South African manufacturing sector is characterised by
"high"concentration and high markups and (ii), an increase in product market competition should
have large positive e⁄ects on productivity growth in South Africa (Aghion et al (2007: 17). A
natural question to ask then is: Should we be worried about the above ￿ndings?
The ￿ndings are to some extent disconcerting especially when it comes to growth and employ-
ment. However, the following have to be taken into consideration. First, the implied markups
are excessive by international comparisons (Aghion et al (2007); Fedderke et al (2005)). Clearly
therefore, if these high markups also re￿ ect high pro￿ts, they are not sustainable in the long-run.
There is bound to be entry of new players and increased import penetration ￿more so in the face
of trade liberalisation. Indeed, Du Plessis and Gilbert (2007) do not ￿nd evidence pointing to the
high pro￿tability of South African listed ￿rms relative to the U.S. listed ￿rms.
Second, it could be that the high markups are justi￿ed by other industry or country speci￿c
characteristics ￿so that after controlling for these (￿xed e⁄ects), the markups are internationally
comparable. As we know from ￿nance, high risk portfolios on average yield higher returns. How-
ever, once we control for the risk, the returns fall in line with those of the market portfolio. The
same could be happening with the high markups in the South African manufacturing sector. As a
developing economy, South Africa may be amenable to risks which are less pronounced or absent
in the developed markets such as the U.S. market. For instance, exchange rate risk may be higher
in South Africa mainly due to the volatility of commodity/resource markets.44 Indeed, ￿rm level
(Worldscope) evidence from publicly listed companies appears to support this view. Although listed
￿rms in South Africa appear to be more pro￿table than "world ￿rms" when measured in terms
of net income/sales,net income/assets and net income/equity, their margins, market to book ratios
43The 3-digit manufacturing sector is just too broad. There is a lot of heterogeneity in each sector (for instance,
each sector can be further broken down into consumer and producer goods subsectors) and as such, factors like entry
barriers, scale economies and advertising intensities that a⁄ect markups and pro￿tability are di¢ cult to incorporate
in the analysis. As Ornstein (1975: 107) points out, ￿the method of aggregating from ￿rm to industry-wide measures
is crucial due to the biases it can introduce￿. The studies by Fedderke and Naumann (2005), Fedderke et al (2005)
and Aghion et al (2007) fail to take into account the heterogeneity within sectors and thus ￿implicitly assume that
all ￿rms within a [sector] have the same margin which equals the [sector] margin￿(ibid).
44See for instance Fedderke and Pillay (2007).
18and price earnings ratios are markedly lower (Aghion et al (2007: 8)). In other words, based on
fundamentals, South Africa￿ s listed ￿rms perform well below their world counterparts.As pointed out
above, in the absence of speci￿c risks, one would expect arbitrage to more or less equalise relative
markups.
Third, on the curtailment of productive capacity, it is not obvious that high industry concen-
tration is not amenable to investments and innovations (see for instance Tirole, (1988); Hannah
(2004). It should be noted that, in general, there is no obvious relationship between concentration
and competition. Even in concentrated industries, threats of entry constantly force market leaders
to invest and innovate so as to remain the leader(s) (e.g., Microsoft). This is termed the "escape
competition" e⁄ect (see Aghion et al (2007)).
Lastly, the price-cost margins computed by Aghion et al (2007: Table 3) are likely to be biased.





This measure su⁄ers from a number of ￿ aws: First, ￿the price-cost margin so measured does not
account for other expenditures such as advertising, R&D, taxes, depreciation, distribution expenses
and components of overhead costs￿(Ornstein (1975: 107)). Failure to account for these costs tends
to overstate the price-cost margins. Second, labour often does have a ￿xed component and it appears
this ￿xed component has not been identi￿ed.46 This tends to understate the price-cost margins. It
is not clear therefore which bias, if any, is driving the results reported in their Table 3. The markups
could be under or overstated. Hence, the high markup ￿ndings should be interpreted with caution.
Indeed, Du Plessis and Gilbert (2007) ￿nd no conclusive evidence that the South African ￿rms are
more pro￿table than their U.S. counterparts.47 Du Plessis and Gilbert (2007) used ￿rm level data
corrected for survivorship bias for the period 1980 to 2006.48
6 Productive vs. Allocative e¢ ciency
In the competition policy framework, high industry concentration and high markups are generally
considered ills of a market economy which need to be addressed. The competition policy debates have
tended to put a lot of weight on allocative e¢ ciency, with the perfectly competitive market outcome
regarded as the ￿ almost￿ ideal market structure. However, for small and developing economies,
productive e¢ ciency is just as important as allocative e¢ ciency, if not more important. This is
especially so in open economies, such as South Africa, where domestic producers face competition
from imports. The small size of the domestic market means high concentration is necessary if ￿rms
are to realise economies of scale in production (Ratnayake (1999)). With fragmented production,
average production costs will be higher as each ￿rm￿ s production capacity is far short of the minimum
e¢ cient scale (MES). This therefore raises the question: Is high industry concentration necessarily
bad for the South African economy?
Concentration and high markups may be important for economic growth in small and developing
economies. Whereas productive e¢ ciency favors market concentration (￿rms have to be large to
45Aghion et al (2007) also employ the following measure of price cost margin: PMC2 = (pY ￿ wL ￿ rK)=pY;where
Y;L and K are respectively the output, labour and capital measured at the sector level. This measure also su⁄ers
from the same weaknesses as PMC1:
46Fedderke and Hill (2006) ￿nd that about two thirds of labour employed in South African manufacturing is devoted
to ￿xed costs while only a third of the labour is devoted to variable costs.
47Du Plessis and Gilbert also point out that the Aghion et al (2007) ￿ndings of high marks-up in the South African
manufacturing industry may su⁄er from survivorship bias as Aghion et al (2007) do not discuss their sample selection
procedure.
48Du Plessis and Gilbert only compare the South African ￿rms to the U.S. ￿rms while Aghion et al (2007) compare
South African listed ￿rms to listed ￿rms in 60 countries.
19reap scale economies), allocative e¢ ciency favours market fragmentation (Fedderke and Simbanegavi
(2007)).49 This is because a fragmented industry (especially in a small market) faces high production
costs and hence low pro￿ts (other things being equal) ￿ which does not augur well for growth
(retained pro￿ts are an important source of investment funds (Von Ungern-Sternberg (1980)). Also,
at a global level (as shown in the survey of the concentration-productivity debates), the evidence
on the relationship between concentration and productivity is inconclusive. Some studies ￿nd that
higher concentration promotes productivity while others (for instance Fedderke and Szalontai (2004))
￿nd evidence of a negative causal relationship.
Insisting on allocative e¢ ciency as the objective of competition policy in the face of small markets
also renders local ￿rms less competitive internationally (high production costs). This tends to reduce
export competitiveness (export penetration) and increase import penetration. This obviously doesn￿ t
augur well for employment retention and creation.
In summary, in addition to investigating the trends in industry concentration and the attendant
markups, it is also important to investigate the determinants of industry concentration. Knowing the
causes of industry concentration has important implications for competition policy. For instance,
in the New Zealand economy, economies of scale have been found to be the major determinant
of industry concentration (Ratnayake (1999)). This, as Ratnayake points out, may explain New
Zealand￿ s relatively lenient antitrust policies, especially towards mergers. These determinants have,
to our knowledge, not been investigated in the South African industry.
7 Trade liberalisation and industry structure
7.1 Debate on the extent of trade liberalisation in South Africa
Fedderke and Vaze (2001) examine the extent to which South Africa￿ s trade regime has opened up
since the implementation of trade liberalisation measures (i.e., during the course of the 1990s). They
consider 38 sectors of the South African economy. They ￿nd that the hype about ￿signi￿cant trade
liberalisation￿is not borne out by the data. In particular, in terms of the e⁄ective rates of protection
(ERP), trade liberalisation has had a limited e⁄ect on e⁄ective protection of South African industries.
South African industries are still heavily protected. In some industries, protection appears to have
increased (Fedderke and Vaze (2001)).50 Fedderke and Vaze qualify their ￿ndings by pointing out
that ERP may not be a good measure of the extent of trade liberalisation in the context of South
Africa￿ s trade regime (p. 471).51
Rangasamy and Harmse (2003) challenge the ￿ndings of Fedderke and Vaze (2001), in particular,
their conclusion that protection appears to have increased over the period under study. They point
out a number of possible shortcomings with the Fedderke-Vaze approach which could have biased
their ￿ndings, for instance, the fact that not all sectors were accounted for in the Fedderke-Vaze
study. Rangasamy and Harmse reach a di⁄erent conclusion: ￿less of South Africa￿ s output enjoyed
protection in 2001 (or even in 1998) than in 1988￿(p. 718). Put di⁄erently, they conclude that, based
on ERP analysis, tari⁄protection has largely decreased. That is, trade liberalisation has successfully
taken place but whether it could have occurred at a faster pace remains an open question (ibid: 721).
Fedderke and Vaze (2004), in their response to Rangasamy and Harmse, note that their main ￿nding
of the original study, that more of South Africa￿ s output is protected in 1998 than in 1988, is in
principle actually con￿rmed by the Rangasamy and Harmse study (Fedderke and Vaze (2004; 411)).
49However, note that market concentration and allocative e¢ ciency are not mutually exclusive. The Bertrand case
provides an example.
50This ￿nding is in line with the ￿ndings of Fedderke et al (2005) and Aghion et al (2007) of high markups in South
African manufacturing sectors. As Fedderke and Vaze (2001) point out, ERP measures the shelter that a sector has
from international prices and is thus a proxy for excess returns a sector can realise due to protective trade (p. 437).
51This is because a signi￿cant feature of SA￿ s trade liberalisation has been the movement from quantitative restric-
tions (quotas) to tari⁄ lines. In this case, e⁄ective protections rates may understate the extent of trade liberalisation
(Fedderke and Vaze (2001: 471)).
20Given the seemingly di⁄erent positions taken by Fedderke and Vaze (2001, 2004) on the one
hand, and Rangasamy and Harmse (2003) on the other, Edwards (2005) re-evaluates the extent to
which South Africa has liberalised its trade since the late 1980s. He ￿nds that signi￿cant progress
has been made in terms of reducing tari⁄ protection. In particular, between 1994 and 2004, the
￿e⁄ective protection in manufacturing fell from 48% to 12.7%￿(p. 774).52 Moreover, the pace at
which liberalisation has taken place is in line with the pace in other lower-middle income countries.
Edwards￿ s ￿ndings appear to support the conclusion of Fedderke and Vaze (2001, 2004) that liberali-
sation has been incomplete. In particular, Edwards notes that further progress (in the simpli￿cation
of tari⁄ structures and reduction of protection) can be made since e⁄ective protection still remain
high in some sectors.53
7.2 Trade liberalisation and markups
Edwards and Van De Winkel (2005) investigate the e⁄ect of trade liberalisation on South African
manufacturing sector markups. They employ data for the period 1970-2002. Their ￿ndings largely
disagree with those of Fedderke et al (2005). More precisely, compared to Fedderke et al (2005) and
Aghion et al (2007), Edwards and Van De Winkel (2005) ￿nd substantially lower markups for the
South African manufacturing sector (see their Table 1). Even more, markups in the South African
manufacturing sector are low by international standards (see their Figure 2).
Edwards and Van De Winkel also consider the e⁄ects of tari⁄ reduction and increased import
penetration on markups. They ￿nd that trade liberalisation serves to lower markups. In particular,
￿a 1% reduction in tari⁄s during the second period (1995-2002) reduced markups in manufacturing
by approximately 2 percentage points￿ (p. 8). This ￿nding accords well with intuition. This
￿nding is further supported by their examination of the e⁄ects of increased import penetration on
markups.54
By reducing tari⁄s and other impediments to international trade, trade liberalisation should
raise the volume of imports coming into South Africa. As the supply increases, competition should
intensify so that the average prices and hence the markups should decline. One potential e⁄ect of
trade liberalisation is the lowering of industry concentration as domestic ￿rms cede part of their
market shares to imports.55 This e⁄ectively lowers the markups. However, even if concentration
does not fall, trade liberalisation increases the contestability of the domestic markets to import
competition and this works to discipline domestic producers.56
As we pointed out earlier, one of the goals of government economic policy in South Africa is to
reduce/eradicate poverty. The favoured way to achieve this goal is to grow the economy at a faster
pace whilst ensuring that the bene￿ts of growth ￿lter down to the poor. This has been summarised
in the acronym: ASGI-SA which stands for Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South
Africa. Trade liberalisation may bene￿t consumers in at least two ways: First, increased import
competition forces the domestic ￿rms to reduce margins ￿thereby bene￿ting consumers in the form
of lower prices (Edwards, 2005: 1). Second, trade liberalisation can provide consumers the bene￿t of
increased product variety. Thurlow (2006) investigates the relation between trade liberalisation and
pro-poor growth in South Africa. Using simulations, he ￿nds that trade liberalisation has positively
a⁄ected economic growth in South Africa. There has been increased investment and it has facilitated
52These percentages are unweighted averages. Fedderke and Vaze (2001) use Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
weighted ERPs.
53Ibid.
54Fedderke et al (2005: 21) already noted this.
55Edwards and Van De Winkel (2005: 1) point out that imports as a share of domestic expenditure has risen from
17% to 28% between 1990 and 2000. This shows a substantial increase in import penetration. They also note the
substantial increase in export penetration.
56It is not obvious though that increased import penetration is procompetitive. It is not uncommon that importers
and domestic producers collude and thus arti￿cially maintain high prices. Thus, to fully realise the disciplining e⁄ect
of trade liberalisation, vigilance on the part of the Competition Commission is indispensable.
21productivity enhancing technological change in the manufacturing sector (p. 14). Although the poor
appear to have disproportionately carried the negative e⁄ects of trade liberalisation, they have not
been made worse. If anything, trade liberalisation has prevented many households from falling into
poverty (ibid).
8 Implications for competition policy in South Africa
What does the totality of evidence in respect of the South African manufacturing sector tell us? The
various studies of the South African manufacturing sector can be summarised as follows: The man-
ufacturing sector in South Africa is characterised by ￿high￿industrial concentration (as measured
by the Gini and Rosenbluth Indices) and ￿high￿marks-ups relative to comparable industries else-
where. High markups and high concentration appear to carry negative implications for investment,57
productivity growth, employment and GDP growth for South Africa.
Although the South African studies surveyed in this paper are useful in formulating broad policy
positions, they are of limited use in the formulation of precise competition policy for a number of
reasons. First, studies of the manufacturing sector as a whole (3 digit SIC) are not precise enough
for policy purposes as they would call for a ￿one size ￿ts all￿remedy. Each industry/sector is likely
to exhibit signi￿cant intra-industry heterogeneity yet this heterogeneity within an industry may get
subsumed in the inter-industry (aggregate) treatments. For instance, the panel studies of the 3 digit
manufacturing sector are silent on the de￿nition of the relevant market or the conduct of ￿rms in
a particular market. These are crucial for determining the extent to which ￿rms in a given market
are exercising market power and hence to the formulation of the appropriate remedy.
Second, it is important to take cognisance of the limitations of industry concentration as a
measure of market power. Concentration is a very crude measure of market power. As such, other
market information such as entry barriers, price controls, other trade restrictions, etc., should also be
taken into consideration. Such detail is not found in the aggregate manufacturing industry studies
surveyed in this paper. This detail is very important. For instance, although the Plastic products
sector shows high concentration (see Table 3 above), Fedderke and Simbanegavi (2007), in their
study of pricing power in the polymer market (a sub-market of the Plastic products sector) in South
Africa, ￿nd no evidence of the exercise of market power by the dominant ￿rms (virtually a duopoly)
in this market. On the contrary, the evidence in the polymer market points to a highly contested
market.58
Third, due to data limitations, the literature on industry concentration in South Africa has more
or less exclusively relied on the Gini coe¢ cient and the Rosenbluth index as measures of industry
concentration. These measures, it should be noted, are not very good measures of industrial con-
centration (at least in the sense of market power) and as such, they have not found wide application
in the international literature (see discussion in Section II). In particular, the Gini coe¢ cient is
not a measure of industry concentration but rather a measure of inequality in ￿rm size distribution
(Leach (1992); Horvath (1972)). Given these shortcomings of the measures employed to examine
industrial concentration in South Africa, we urge caution in the interpretation of the results as well
as parsimony when it comes to generalisations.
Fourth, the research on concentration in the South African manufacturing sector has not ad-
dressed the question of the major sources of industry concentration in the South African manufac-
turing sector. This question has policy implications. For instance, in a study of industry concentra-
tion in New Zealand, Ratnayake (1999), ￿ngers economies of scale as the major source of industry
concentration. He argues that this might explain the New Zealand Commerce Commission￿ s lenient
policy towards mergers.
57Fedderke and Szalontai￿ s (2004) results are mixed while Fedderke and Naumann (2005) ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of
concentration on investment. However, Aghion et al (2007) are supportive of Fedderke and Naumann (2005). They
￿nd a strong and negative e⁄ect of high markups on productivity growth in South Africa.
58This point to the importance of ￿rm level data to complement industry studies.
22Fifth, the evidence on manufacturing sector markups in South Africa is mixed. Whereas Fedderke
et al (2005) and Aghion et al (2007) ￿nd high markups, Edwards and Van de Winkel (2005) ￿nd
low markups. Thus, although available evidence appear to favour ￿high￿markups, parsimony is
preferred in the interim and more research is required in order to shed more light on this issue (see
also Du Plessis and Gilbert (2007, 2008)).
In conclusion, we note that the foundation has been laid by the inter-industry studies of the
South African manufacturing sector. The evidence that has been put forward based on these inter-
industry studies should be viewed largely as ￿ stylised facts￿as there may be signi￿cant unobserved
intra-industry heterogeneity. As such, to get more precise evidence in respect of the competitiveness
(or otherwise) of the South African manufacturing sector, it is imperative that research should now
focus on detailed studies of single industries (intra-industry studies) if policy is to address the speci￿c
shortcomings of the particular industries as far as competition and competitiveness are concerned.
However, as pointed out earlier, a major obstacle in this regard is the dearth of quality ￿rm level
and market level data. Data ought to be availed more frequently if analyses and policy prescriptions
are to be reasonably precise.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Total manufacturing value added by province 
1970  1996 
Notes: Our data exclude the former TVBC states. LMP=Limpopo; NW=North-West; G=Gauteng; 
MP=Mpumalanga; NC=Northern Cape; FS=Free State; KZN=KwaZulu-Natal; WC=Western Cape; 
EC=Eastern Cape. 
Source: Fedderke and Wollnik (2007). 
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Source: Aghion et al (2007). 
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Source: Aghion et al (2007). 
 














































Notes: Lines denote the total impact of a 1% increase in the Gini concentration measure at the 
specified alternate magnitudes (0.1 - 0.9) of the Gini concentration measure. The X-axis specifies 
alternative numbers of firms present in the market. The Y-axis measures the % change in 
employment that issues from the 1% change in the Gini concentration measure.
1 
Source: Fedderke and Szalontai (2004). 
 
 
                                                 
1 Note that the truncation to the decrease in the G=0.5, G=0.7 and G=0.9 cases arises due to the fact that the 
Rosenbluth index is bounded by unity. 
28Figure 5: Trend Structure in Labour Flexibility and the Elasticity of Substitution 



















































































































































































Labour Flexibility sigma Poly. (Labour Flexibility) Poly. (sigma)  
Source: Fedderke and Hill (2006). 
29Table 1: Four Hypothetical Market Structures 
I  0.8  0.1  0.1       
II  0.8  0.1  0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
III  0.35  0.35  0.3       
IV  0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15        
Source: Marfels (1971). 
 
 
Table 2: Concentration in Four Hypothetical Distributions 
Measure I  II  III  IV 
HHI  0.6600 0.6530 0.3350 0.2900 
R  0.6250 0.5263 0.3448 0.3125 
G  0.4667 0.7625 0.0333 0.2000 
Source: Marfels (1971). 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of Theoretical Priors and Empirical South African Findings  
 HCAP  LAB  TD  SCALE  LINKS 
prior >0  >0        Heckscher-
Ohlin  actual +0.09 -0.02       
prior     >0      Ricardian 
actual    +0.06    
prior       >0    New 
Trade  actual      +0.19  
prior >0      >0  >0  Economic 
Geography  actual +0.09      +0.19 -0.63 
Note: Figures report elasticities. 
Source: Fedderke and Wollnik (2007) 
 
 
Table 4. Average 3-digit Levels of Concentration 1972-1988 
Variable   1972  1982  1985  1988 
3 CR   0.3417 0.3867  0.3517  0.3667 
HHI   0.0966  0.0916  0.1009 
Horvath  0.2431 0.2597  0.2460  0.2639 
Rosenbluth  0.0622 0.0591  0.0597  0.0591 
Gini  0.7819 0.8244  0.8209  0.8438 
Source: Fourie (1996). 
 
30Table 5. Average 5-digit Levels of Concentration 1972-1988 
Variable  1972 1982 1985 1988 
3 CR   0.5651 0.5574 0.5711 0.5747 
HHI   0.1883  0.2020  0.1917 
Horvath  0.4054 0.4048 0.4157 0.4110 
Rosenbluth   0.1484  0.1613  0.1550 
Gini   0.6952  0.6967  0.7139 
Source: Fourie (1996). 
 
 
Table 6. Gini Coefficients: Levels and rankings 














Food and food products   0.8180 0.8701 0.9028 0.8843  0.0663  7  6  2  5  -2 
Beverages  0.8480 0.7834 0.8856 0.8778  0.0298  4  20  5  7  3 
Textiles  0.7610 0.8297 0.8555 0.7616  0.0006  18  13  12  24  6 
Clothing, except footwear  0.7850 0.8003 0.8109 0.8023  0.0173  13  17  20  18  5 
Leather and products from leather  0.6670 0.7562 0.8143 0.8669  0.1999  24  22  18  10  -14 
Footwear  0.7040 0.6974 0.7867 0.7713  0.0673  22  24  24  23  1 
Wood and wood and cork products  0.7110 0.8030 0.8380 0.8031  0.0921  21  16  14  17  -4 
Furniture  0.7570 0.7696 0.7890 0.7905  0.0335  19  21  23  21  2 
Paper and paper products  0.7520 0.8031 0.8864 0.8893  0.1373  20  15  4  4  -16 
Printing, publishing and  
allied industries 
0.7860 0.7963 0.8288 0.8354  0.0494  11  18  16  15  4 
Basic chemicals  0.8150 0.8682 0.8552 0.8786  0.0636  9  7  13  6  -3 
Other Chemicals  0.7770 0.8737 0.8363 0.8561  0.0791  14  5  15  14  0 
Rubber products  0.8310 0.8603 0.8715 0.8763  0.0453  5  8  8  8  3 
Plastic products  0.6910 0.7399 0.8048 0.7800  0.0890  23  23  22  22  -1 
Glass and glass products  0.8280 0.8431 0.8814 0.9162  0.0882  6  10  6  2  -4 
Other Non-metals  0.7960 0.8744 0.8682 0.8621  0.0661  10  4  9  12  2 
Basic iron and steel industries  0.8550 0.8954 0.8907 0.8723  0.0173  3  1  3  9  6 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries  0.7760 0.8502 0.8634 0.8615  0.0855  15  9  11  13  -2 
Metal products, except machinery 
 and equipment   
0.7850 0.8248 0.8117 0.8141  0.0291  12  14  19  16  4 
Machinery, except electrical  0.7690 0.7939 0.8073 0.7936  0.0246  17  19  21  20  3 
Electrical machinery apparatus,  
appliances and supplies 
0.8150 0.8429 0.8680 0.7973 -0.0177  8  11  10  19  11 
Motor vehicles, parts and accessories  0.8860 0.8936 0.9129 0.9181  0.0321  1  2  1  1  0 
Transport equipment  0.8730 0.8895 0.8781 0.8637 -0.0093  2  3  7  11  9 
Other manufacturing industries  0.7735 0.8326 0.8279 0.8978  0.1243  16  12  17  3  -13 
AVERAGE FOR ALL INDUSTRIES  0.7858 0.8247 0.8490 0.8446  0.0588           




31Table 7:  Rosenbluth Concentration Index:  Level and ranking 












Food and food products   0.0046 0.0050 0.0071 0.0051  0.0005  22  19  16  16  -6 
Beverages  0.0282 0.0208 0.0528 0.0502  0.0220  8  10  5  4  -4 
Textiles  0.0081 0.0094 0.0086 0.0062  -0.0019  17  14  14  15  -2 
Clothing, except footwear  0.0039 0.0039 0.0035 0.0031  -0.0008  23  22  21  19  -4 
Leather and products from leather  0.0238 0.0233 0.0305 0.0485  0.0247  10  8  8  5  -5 
Footwear  0.0281 0.0225 0.0214 0.0171  -0.0110  9  9  10  10  1 
Wood and wood and cork products  0.0065 0.0081 0.0087 0.0039  -0.0026  18  16  13  18  0 
Furniture  0.0064 0.0046 0.0033 0.0031  -0.0033  19  20  22  20  1 
Paper and paper products  0.0294 0.0242 0.0297 0.0242  -0.0052  7  7  9  9  2 
Printing, publishing and  
allied industries 
0.0055 0.0040 0.0037 0.0031  -0.0024  20  21  20  22  2 
Basic chemicals  0.0440 0.0451 0.0349 0.0448  0.0008  6  6  6  7  1 
Other Chemicals  0.0127 0.0161 0.0102 0.0096  -0.0031  15  11  12  12  -3 
Rubber products  0.0971 0.0909 0.0548 0.0449  -0.0522  2  2  4  6  4 
Plastic products  0.0130 0.0100 0.0073 0.0044  -0.0086  14  13  15  17  3 
Glass and glass products  0.1533 0.1798 0.1333 0.1657  0.0124  1  1  1  1  0 
Other Non-metals  0.0139 0.0079 0.0070 0.0064  -0.0074  13  17  17  14  1 
Basic iron and steel industries  0.0515 0.0529 0.0630 0.0860  0.0345  4  4  3  2  -2 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries  0.0507 0.0601 0.0673 0.0811  0.0304  5  3  2  3  -2 
Metal products, except machinery 
 and equipment   
0.0025 0.0021 0.0014 0.0013  -0.0012  24  24  24  24  0 
Machinery, except electrical  0.0049 0.0032 0.0022 0.0017  -0.0032  21  23  23  23  2 
Electrical machinery apparatus,  
appliances and supplies 
0.0119 0.0084 0.0069 0.0031  -0.0088  16  15  18  21  5 
Motor vehicles, parts and accessories  0.0166 0.0123 0.0128 0.0108  -0.0058  12  12  11  11  -1 
Transport equipment  0.0697 0.0474 0.0311 0.0281  -0.0416  3  5  7  8  5 
Other manufacturing industries  0.0196 0.0059 0.0045 0.0083  -0.0113  11  18  19  13  2 
AVERAGE FOR ALL INDUSTRIES  0.029 0.028 0.025 0.028  -0.002        












32Table 8: C5% Concentration Index for South African Manufacturing Industry  
Sector
nC 5 %nC 5 %nC 5 %nC 5 %
Food and Food Products  76 65.29 72 70.12 71 75.16 134 65.93
Beverages 12 55.64 9 62.68 8 74.26 21 76.27
Textiles 26 52.29 32 55.92 34 48.11 51 36.00
Clothing, except Footwear 60 46.75 61 50.58 81 58.68 75 34.18
Leather and Leather Products 8 37.17 8 50.25 8 67.86 12 27.69
Footwear 6 36.73 7 46.08 13 56.42 16 39.99
Wood and Wood and Cork Products 32 51.35 30 63.34 65 61.10 67 38.45
Paper and Paper Products 8 53.36 11 75.43 19 62.05 30 78.13
Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 56 60.99 65 62.45 99 69.25 83 48.90
Basic Chemicals 7 69.55 9 62.88 12 70.79 23 68.55
Rubber Products 22 55.97 26 66.16 36 80.85 64 40.33
Plastic Products 3 36.55 4 46.63 9 56.67 14 30.22
Glass and Glass Products 16 53.46 23 85.40 51 87.31 58 69.74
Other Non-Metals 1 69.60 2 75.83 4 74.96 13 66.07
Basic Iron and Steel Industries 45 73.48 51 76.93 57 69.89 56 76.00
Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 6 47.60 10 63.07 5 64.66 30 70.60
Metal Products, except Machinery and Equipment 4 58.48 5 65.47 4 67.34 45 47.49
Machinery, except Electrical 119 56.14 143 60.24 206 61.79 225 38.41
Electrical Machinery Apparatus 54 60.77 93 66.58 144 58.26 248 51.60
Motor Vehicles, Parts and Accessories 29 79.42 40 83.90 81 85.19 89 78.87
Transport Equipment 33 68.01 40 73.37 56 75.27 120 58.99
Furniture 37 53.39 53 52.12 78 58.38 67 56.68
Other Manufacturing Industries 7 53.15 11 59.90 13 83.38 30 50.66
Average 29 56.31 35 64.14 50 68.16 68 54.34
Average weighted by output 60.81 66.52 69.01 61.09
output attributable to that group of firms.
Source: Values for 1972 - 1996 from Fedderke and Szalontai (2004), Values for 2001 based on Stats SA, Large Sample Survey (2004)
Notes: n refers to the number of firms making up the group of 5% of largest firms while the C5% value refers to the cummulative percentage of 
1976 1985 1996 2001
 
Source: Fedderke and Naumann (2005).
33Table 9: Gini Index for South African Manufacturing Industry, 1972 – 2001  
Sector
1972 1979 1988 1996 2001 1996 - 2001 1972 - 2001
Food and Food Products  0.818 0.872 0.900 0.884 0.752 -0.132 -0.066
Beverages 0.848 0.775 0.878 0.878 0.796 -0.081 -0.052
Textiles 0.761 0.833 0.846 0.762 0.490 -0.271 -0.271
Clothing, except Footwear 0.785 0.807 0.804 0.802 0.532 -0.270 -0.253
Leather and Leather Products 0.667 0.759 0.813 0.867 0.612 -0.255 -0.055
Footwear 0.704 0.687 0.746 0.771 0.534 -0.237 -0.170
Wood and Wood and Cork Products 0.711 0.800 0.840 0.803 0.558 -0.245 -0.153
Paper and Paper Products 0.752 0.794 0.883 0.889 0.784 -0.105 0.032
Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 0.786 0.796 0.826 0.835 0.651 -0.185 -0.135
Basic Chemicals 0.815 0.860 0.842 0.879 0.765 -0.114 -0.050
Rubber Products 0.831 0.852 0.876 0.876 0.652 -0.224 -0.179
Plastic Products 0.691 0.722 0.797 0.780 0.486 -0.294 -0.205
Glass and Glass Products 0.828 0.870 0.880 0.916 0.813 -0.103 -0.015
Other Non-Metals 0.796 0.875 0.866 0.862 0.737 -0.125 -0.059
Basic Iron and Steel Industries 0.855 0.896 0.898 0.872 0.801 -0.071 -0.054
Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 0.776 0.858 0.874 0.861 0.771 -0.090 -0.005
Metal Products, except Machinery and Equipment 0.785 0.829 0.808 0.814 0.585 -0.229 -0.200
Machinery, except Electrical 0.769 0.788 0.799 0.794 0.547 -0.247 -0.222
Electrical Machinery Apparatus 0.815 0.841 0.868 0.797 0.697 -0.100 -0.118
Motor Vehicles, Parts and Accessories 0.886 0.892 0.906 0.918 0.770 -0.148 -0.116
Transport Equipment 0.873 0.900 0.886 0.864 0.644 -0.220 -0.229
Furniture 0.757 0.773 0.784 0.791 0.676 -0.114 -0.081
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.774 0.842 0.815 0.898 0.719 -0.179 -0.054
Average 0.786 0.823 0.845 0.844 0.668 -0.176 -0.118
Average weighted by output 0.800 0.837 0.854 0.848 0.702 -0.146 -0.098
Source: Values for 1972 - 1996 from Fedderke and Szalontai (2004), Calculations for 2001 based on Stats SA, Large Sample Survey (2004)
Gini Index Change
 
Source: Fedderke and Naumann (2005). 
34Table 10: Rosenbluth Index for South African Manufacturing Industry, 1972 – 2001 
 
Sector
1972 1979 1988 1996 2001 1996 - 2001 1972 - 2001
Food and Food Products  0.0046 0.0051 0.0070 0.0051 0.0015 -0.0036 -0.0031
Beverages 0.0282 0.0194 0.0483 0.0502 0.0116 -0.0386 -0.0166
Textiles 0.0081 0.0099 0.0087 0.0062 0.0019 -0.0043 -0.0062
Clothing, except Footwear 0.0039 0.0040 0.0037 0.0031 0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0025
Leather and Leather Products 0.0238 0.0242 0.0300 0.0485 0.0104 -0.0381 -0.0134
Footwear 0.0281 0.0219 0.0216 0.0171 0.0067 -0.0104 -0.0214
Wood and Wood and Cork Products 0.0065 0.0082 0.0092 0.0039 0.0017 -0.0022 -0.0048
Paper and Paper Products 0.0294 0.0254 0.0300 0.0242 0.0077 -0.0165 -0.0217
Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 0.0055 0.0041 0.0037 0.0031 0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0038
Basic Chemicals 0.0440 0.0428 0.0329 0.0448 0.0094 -0.0354 -0.0346
Rubber Products 0.0971 0.0853 0.0670 0.0449 0.0103 -0.0346 -0.0868
Plastic Products 0.0130 0.0100 0.0081 0.0044 0.0017 -0.0027 -0.0113
Glass and Glass Products 0.1533 0.2129 0.1265 0.1657 0.0210 -0.1447 -0.1323
Other Non-Metals 0.0139 0.0080 0.0073 0.0064 0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0104
Basic Iron and Steel Industries 0.0515 0.0579 0.0587 0.0860 0.0083 -0.0778 -0.0432
Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 0.0507 0.0630 0.0713 0.0811 0.0048 -0.0763 -0.0459
Metal Products, except Machinery and Equipment 0.0025 0.0022 0.0015 0.0013 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0020
Machinery, except Electrical 0.0049 0.0033 0.0023 0.0017 0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0045
Electrical Machinery Apparatus 0.0119 0.0086 0.0075 0.0031 0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0100
Motor Vehicles, Parts and Accessories 0.0166 0.0127 0.0126 0.0108 0.0018 -0.0090 -0.0148
Transport Equipment 0.0697 0.0541 0.0350 0.0281 0.0048 -0.0234 -0.0649
Furniture 0.0064 0.0049 0.0036 0.0031 0.0023 -0.0008 -0.0041
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.0196 0.0065 0.0045 0.0083 0.0020 -0.0063 -0.0176
Average 0.0301 0.0302 0.0261 0.0283 0.0051 -0.0232 -0.0250
Average weighted by output 0.0218 0.0211 0.0217 0.0265 0.0038 -0.0227 -0.0180
Source: Values for 1972 - 1996 from Fedderke and Szalontai (2004), Calculations for 2001 based on Stats SA, Large Sample Survey (2004)
Rosen Index Change
 
Source: Fedderke and Naumann (2005). 
 
  
35Table 11: Estimation results for the labour usage equation and the investment 
function 




































































































ARDL 2,2,0,1,0,1  2,2,2,1,1,1 1,2,0,2,0,2,2 ARDL  1,3,3,3,3,0  1,3,3,3,3,0  3,2,2,2,3,2,0 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance. Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors. Figures in 
square parentheses denote probability values. 
















36Table 12: Investment Function – Estimation Results for Various Specifications,  
Pooled Mean Group Estimator  








σ sect -0.074* -0.083*
(0.034) (0.023)












LR:    299.07* 285.32*
 
Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, h-test denotes Hausman test, 
Square parentheses are probability values, * denotes statistical significane at 






































10)  0.79 0.87 0.61 0.70 0.68 1.08 
Beverages 1.07* 
(0.
12)  1.45 1.47 0.97 1.30 1.17 2.29 
Tobacco 4.05* 
(0.
58)  4.27 0.73 5.03 3.79 2.16 -7.79 
Textiles 0.51* 
(0.
06)  0.49 0.56 0.30 0.39 0.82 1.26 
Wearing apparel   0.29* 
(0.
07)  0.35 0.29 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.63 
Leather & leather 
products 0.16* 
(0.
03)  0.17 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.07 -0.25 
Footwear 0.14* 
(0.
04)  0.10 0.14 0.10 0.15 -0.69 0.47 
Wood & wood products  0.55* 
(0.
06)  0.93 0.79 0.59 0.77 -0.24 0.22 
Paper & paper products  0.84* 
(0.
09)  0.17 0.81 0.73 0.81 1.02 1.19 
Printing, publishing & 
recorded media  0.28* 
(0.
06)  0.35 0.39 0.31 0.45 1.19 0.07 
Coke & refined 
petroleum 3.31* 
(0.
60)  1.55 2.90 2.93 2.98 4.74 2.12 
Basic chemicals  0.83* 
(0.
11)  0.89 0.79 0.34 0.84 5.05 0.59 
Other chemicals & 
man-made fibers  0.70* 
(0.
06)  0.40 0.93 0.61 0.76 0.29 0.29 
Rubber products  0.52* 
(0.
06)  0.58 0.60 0.42 0.48 0.03 0.07 
Plastic products  0.69* 
(0.
09)  0.45 0.75 0.50 0.56 1.82 0.85 
Glass  &  glass  products  **     0.28 0.40 0.58 0.65 0.84 1.36 
Non-metallic minerals  0.96* 
(0.
25)  0.70 0.79 0.58 0.62 0.29 1.03 
Basic iron & steel  0.60* 
(0.
11)  0.54 0.54 0.24 0.24 0.24 1.52 
Basic non-ferrous 
metals  0.77* 
(0.
12)  2.75 1.35 0.76 1.16 0.62 1.55 
Metal products 
excluding machinery  0.41* 
(0.
05)  0.44 0.46 0.32 0.40 0.30 0.79 
Machinery & equipment  0.29* 
(0.
05)  0.14 0.23 0.25 0.39 0.36 0.27 
Electrical machinery & 
apparatus  0.49* 
(0.
05)  0.93 0.72 0.45 0.62 0.38 -0.01 
Television, & 
communication 
equipment  0.46* 
(0.
05)  0.28 0.39 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.52 
Professional & 
scientific equipment  0.52* 
(0.
06)  0.74 0.61 0.53 0.82 0.98 1.12 
Motor vehicles, parts & 
accessories 0.39* 
(0.




08)  0.70 0.49 0.46 0.50 -0.04 0.11 
Furniture 0.20* 
(0.
03)  0.42 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.42 
Other manufacturing  2.16* 
(0.
19)  3.12 2.00 2.09 3.28 5.73 4.50 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level, ** denotes case in which statistically reliable results were 
not available   
Source: Aghion et al (2007). 
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